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1 Introduction
The paper analyzes a simple quota-based compensation scheme between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-
averse agent when an adverse selection problem and a moral hazard problem occur. A quota-based contract
is a piece-wise linear performance-based compensation scheme that can be regarded as a menu of two simple
contracts such as fixed wage and piece-rate contracts. The paper shows that a simple quota-based contract
can secure a substantial gain that the firm secures with a theoretically optimal menu of linear contracts,
although a single linear contract does not perform well in general. The identified strong performance of
quota-based piece-wise linear contracts may help to explain their widespread use in practice.
How do firms compensate heterogeneous workers by a simple compensation scheme? Fixed-payment
and piece-rate contracts are common in practice. The literature on pay for performance has argued the
prevalence of simple compensation plans rather than complex and fine-tuned nonlinear contracts.1 Simple
plans are easy to understand by the salespersons, and the cost of enforcement of contracts is low.
Most incentive schemes observed in practice are piece-wise linear. My paper is close in sprit to Schmalensee
(1989) and Larkin (2014). Regarding the issue of pay for performance, as Larkin (2014) noted, quotas are
commonly used as an incentive-free threshold that salespeople must clear in order to start earning com-
missions, or sometimes to earn a bonus. However, Gibbs (2013, pp.411-414) argued a couple of negative
effects under piece-wise linear-threshold compensation contracts. Oyer (1998) also discussed the problem
of timing gaming caused by the use of sales quotas. Tsuru (2008) empirically examined the impact of of a
performance-based pay scheme introduced by a large Japanese auto sales firm. A linear compensation system
1Eggleston et al (2000, p.91) point out that recent work in the law and economics of contracts suggests that contracts ought
to be highly complex and fine-tuned. They argue a number of reasons why simple contracts prevail.
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was replaced with a quota-based contract. Tsuru (2008) found undesirable gaming behavior by examining
the data supplied by the dealership personnel for the period before and after the pay scheme change. Larkin
(2014) empirically examined the gaming cost of a nonlinear incentive scheme in terms of forgone revenue
for the firm. As mentioned in Gibbs (2013, p.413), a natural question raised can be now stated: given the
negative effects of thresholds, why do firms use quota-based contracts? The paper provides theoretical justi-
fication for the use of a simple quota-based compensation plan and the intuition for why a single piece-wise
linear contract is a good approximation of more complex contracts.
A series of studies have utilized the framework of agency theory to examine the relative performance
of different contracts. Basu et al (1985) (henceforth called BLSS in the literature) and subsequent studies
have derived the compensation scheme for risk-averse and homogeneous workers, not as a screening device.2
Several works have discussed the structure of a piece-wise-linear-threshold contract. Bose et al (2011)
examined the ability of linear contracts with a threshold to replicate the performance of optimal contracts in
the canonical moral hazard setting in which a risk-neutral principal contracts with a single risk-averse agent.
Somewhat confusingly, Bose et al (2011, p.104) refer to a quota-based piece-wise linear contract as a linear
contract. Raju and Srinivasan (1996) showed that a quota plan with a common salary and commissions
rate across salespersons, but with quotas varying across the salesperson-territories to the optimal agency-
theoretical contract proposed in BLSS. Their numerical experiments indicate that the loss in profits is likely
to be small, only about 1% for the parametric scenarios studied. Chen and Miller (2009) employed numerical
simulations and showed that the optimal piece-wise-linear-threshold contract is significantly superior to the
best linear contract when the agent has a power utility function in a multi-period model. Daljord et al
(2016) paid attention to the constraint faced by firms in fine-tuned contracts to the full distribution of
heterogeneity of their employees, and examine the profitability under partially heterogeneous contracts by
means of numerical experiments. These papers except Bose et al (2011) conducted numerical experiments to
show how a simple piece-wise linear contract performs compared to the agency-theoretic compensation plan.
In contrast to numerical experiments, I shall derive an analytical expression for the performance measure of
simple piece-wise-linear contracts regarded as screening devices, and provide explicit upper and lower bounds
on the entire region of the relevant parameter values. I will treat the menu of linear contracts, in which each
personalized linear contract is linear in a performance measure but the two components such as fixed salary
and commission rate can be non-linear functions of the reported type, as a theoretical benchmark.
Several empirical works have examined the role of compensation policy in influencing worker performance.
Lazear (2000) studied a firm that switched its compensation policy from hourly wages to piece-rate. He
estimated that the average worker’s output increased following the change in compensation policy. Dohmen
and Falk (2011) conducted a further examination of output differences between different incentive schemes.
They studied the impact of multidimensional characteristics such as productivity, risk attitudes, social
preferences, and gender on the choice between a fixed-payment contract and a variable-payment contract
such as piece-rate, tournament, and revenue-sharing contracts. They found that output in all variable-
payment contracts is higher than output under the fixed-payment contract. More recently, Larkin and
Leider (2012) examined subjects’ choices over the linear and convex pay schemes in a laboratory experiment.
They found that overconfident subjects facing a choice between a linear contract and a convex one are more
likely to choose the convex scheme, and suggested that unmotivated employees who wish to exert lower
effort may prefer a linear incentive scheme rather than a convex one. Furthermore, several empirical studies
also examined the change in productivity caused by changes in incentive schemes, for example, Paarsch and
2See Albers (1996) for intensive reviews about the design of salesforce compensation schemes mainly in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Shearer (1999, 2000) and Franceschelli et al (2010). The present paper examines the difference in productivity
under alternative contracts, and argues the relationship between productivity and profitability.
As mentioned earlier, I consider the optimal menu of linear contracts in which workers announce their
types as a theoretical benchmark in this paper. Of course, the menu of linear contracts may not be fully
optimal for the firm in general. For risk-neutral and heterogeneous workers, Rao (1990) examined a sufficient
condition for the implementability of the optimal compensation scheme by a menu of linear contracts. For risk
averse and heterogeneous agents, Bernardo et al (2001) examined optimal capital allocation and managerial
compensation policies in a decentralized firm in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection.
Bernardo et al (2001, Proposition 3, p.322) began by considering managerial compensation contracts in the
form of a menu of linear contracts, and then showed that there does not exist a general mechanism that
improves upon the menu of linear contracts. I am not sure whether the same result would hold in my
framework, but the structure of the fully optimal contract is beyond the scope of this paper.
Combining the results regarding the relative profitability and productivity of simple contracts, the paper
sheds light on the question of why firms use piece-wise-linear-threshold contracts in practice even though
several negative effects has been discussed. The paper examines the performances of simple piece-wise-
linear contracts with and without a quota. The paper provides an explanation for the use of piece-wise-
linear-threshold contract from the view point of economics. The optimal piece-rate contract (as an indirect
mechanism) provides incentives enough to achieve the average productivity of the optimal menu of linear
contracts (as a direct revelation mechanism), and can secure a large fraction of the gain that the menu of
linear contracts captures on the region of parameter values over which there is no bunching in the menu
of linear contracts. However, such good performance no longer persists for a broad parameterizations in
which there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts. Besides, the paper shows that it is not difficult
to construct a simple piece-wise-linear-threshold contract can secure a substantial gain of the optimal menu
of linear contracts over the whole range of admissible parameter values, although such quota-based contract
would have weaker incentives than the piece-rate contract on average.
An important aspect of the paper is the complexity of contracts. The paper also argues the shapes
of compensation schemes defined as direct revelation mechanisms based on the announcements by hetero-
geneous workers. The theoretical benchmark I consider here is the optimal menu of linear contracts, a
continuum of type-dependent linear contracts. Each contract is linear in the performance measure, but it
could be non-linear in the reported type. Needless to say, the implementational complexity of the fully
optimal compensation plan is prohibitive in practice as well as a menu of linear contracts that depends on
announcements of private information. By contrast, piece-wise-linear compensation schemes are functions
of the performance measure, including a fixed-payment contract and a piece-rate contract with and without
thresholds as typical examples. These much simpler contracts are indirect mechanisms from the point of
view of mechanism design. It is worth comparing all of compensation schemes studied in the paper in the
same domain because the optimal menu of linear contracts depends on an announcement of type or private
information rather than on observed output. I provide a procedure transform the optimal menu of linear
contracts as a direct revelation mechanism into an anonymous nonlinear compensation scheme as an indirect
mechanism. This kind of argument is referred to as the ”taxation principle”, the reverse of the ”revelation
principle” in the literature on mechanism design. For any menu of linear contracts satisfying incentive
compatibility and participation constraints, a proposition in the paper provides a constructive procedure to
obtain an indirect mechanism which duplicates the same outcome as the given direct revelation mechanism.
The advantage of the constructive procedure in the paper is that the first-and second-derivatives of the im-
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plied nonlinear compensation scheme are so tractable that I am able to determine the shape of that scheme.
It is shown that the optimal menu of linear contracts can be replaced by a single convex compensation
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section I describe an analytical model. Following
this, I discuss the structure of the compensation plan for risk averse and heterogeneous workers. I pay
attention to two alternative contracts: theory-based menu of linear contracts (direct revelation mechanism)
in Section 3, and quota-based contract (indirect mechanism) in Section 4. Also, a single piece-rate contract
is obtained as a corollary. In Section 5, I analyze the relative performance of simple contracts relative to
the menu of linear contracts. I shall conclude that the quota-based contract is superior to the piece-rate
contract within the entire region of the relevant parameter values. The purpose of Section 6 is twofold.
First, I compare incentive effects among the three forms of compensation schemes in Section 6.1. Secondly, I
provide a constructive way of transforming any feasible menu of linear contracts into an anonymous nonlinear
compensation scheme in Section 6.2. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
This paper examines the performance of simple incentive schemes relative to the menu of linear contracts in
a principal-agent problem under moral hazard and adverse selection. I consider a one-period principal-agent
relationship between a risk-neutral firm (principal) and a risk-averse worker (agent) of the firm. A firm
compensates heterogeneous workers based on uncertain outcomes generated by salespersons’ effort and skill.
The salespersons or the workers are at different skill levels. A given amount of effort does not always result
in the same amount of sales. The firm compensates workers based on sales achieved, and realizes the profit
from the sales net of compensation. Not surprisingly, salesforce compensation has received considerable
attention from marketing academics on theoretical and empirical fronts (see Basu and Kalyanaram, 1990;
Basu et al, 1985; Coughlan and Narasimhan, 1992; Misra et al, 2005; Raju and Srinivasan, 1996).
An important aspect of the selling environment is that a certain amount of effort does not always result
in the same amount of sales because of the existence of uncertainty. Denote a skill level by q and an effort
level by e. A response function specifies the expected sales or output y that depends on the levels of effort
and skill. In order to evaluate the performances of simple contracts, I assume a linear response function
with normal errors as is standard in the literature (see Dutta, 2008; Hölmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Misra
et al, 2005; Picard, 1987). Output y is determined by the effort the worker expends e and the productivity
q of him, according to y = gq + e+ #, where # is the normally distributed noise or measurement error in
output with mean zero and variance s2.3 The term q can be interpreted as the base level of sales in the
absence of salesforce effort. The marginal product of effort is the same across the workers. The parameter g
represents the complementarity between the firm and a worker in the sense that high g firm produces more
3Dutta (2008) employed the response function of the form y = gq + e+ #. He mainly discussed a possibility of bunching in
the menu of linear contracts. My model differs from Dutta (2008) in that I assume that the reservation utility is constant in
order to restrict a type of bunching. Several papers also employed additively linear response functions in effort and private
information term, for instance, Gibbons (1987) and Picard (1987). Gibbons (1987) considered type q that appears in y = q + e
as the difficulty of the job. Only workers know the difficulty of their jobs. In contrast, Goldmanis and Ray (2015) assumed the
multiplicative response function of the form y = gqe+ # whose marginal product of effort is type-dependent, namely, gq. Baker
and Jorgensen (2003) assumed that the output y = qe+ # depends on two independent random variables, one of which q affects
the agent’s marginal product of effort, and the other # does not.
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output with high q types than with low q types. The constant g > 0 is a known parameter to both sides.4
The expression gq can be interpreted as effective skill. The interpretation is that the parameter g reflects
the relative importance of the innate skill in determining the output.
The agent has private information about his skill q that is a degree of heterogeneity in productivity.
There is a continuum of types. The firm’s prior beliefs regarding q are represented by a distribution function
F(q) defined on the interval [qmin, qmax]. It is not necessarily distributed uniformly:
F(q)
4
= 1 

qmax   q
D
 1
h
= 1 

1  q   qmin
D
 1
h
, (1)
where D = qmax   qmin and h 2 (0,¥).5 In what follows, the salesperson’s participation is considered
as exogenous under any types of contracts in the sense that all of types are employed and exclusion is
not allowed.6 Notice that the distribution coincides with the uniform distribution when h = 1. Roughly
speaking, the distribution function has a value near the lower bound qmin when h 2 (0, 1), whereas the
distribution has a value near the upper bound qmax when h 2 (1,¥). The distribution becomes more
favorable when h increases, because a higher value of h means that there is a larger proportion of high skill
salesforces. In fact, the parameter h is interpreted as a first-order stochastic dominance shift parameter.7
The distribution function is flexible, and can accommodate J- and inverted-J-shapes.8 Figure 1 illustrates
the shape of the distribution for some alternative values of h ranging between 0.5 and 4.
θ
10
F(θ)
1
5
η = 0.5
η = 1
η = 2
η = 4
Figure 1: Illustration of the distribution (qmax = 5, qmin = 1)
This distribution allows for closed solutions of optimal contracts discussed below. For this class of
4If g = 0 then the response function is independent of the private information, and salesforces are heterogeneous.
5This kind of a distribution is referred to as a Burr type XII distribution in Miravete (2004). He employed this type of
distribution function in the context of the second-degree price discrimination.
6In this regard, Rao (1990) also assumed that all of salespersons are active in the salesforce.
7dF(q; h)/dh = (qmax   q)
1
h ln ((qmax   q)/D) /h2D
1
h 6 0 with equality only if q = qmin.
8A couple of previous works consider a deviation from the uniform distribution when adverse selection is a potential concern.
For example, Reichelstein (1992) and Chu and Sappington (2007) in the procurement problem. Also, Rao (1990) in the context
of salesforce compensation.
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distribution in Eq.(1), the inverse hazard rate is linear in the private information. This is calculated explicitly
as in Eq.(2). The monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate is automatically satisfied.
1  F(q)
f (q)
= h(qmax   q). (2)
Some useful properties of the above family of distributions are summarized by the following lemma. The
proof is omitted.
Lemma 1 (expectation and variance). When q˜ = qmax   # for some # > 0,Z q˜
qmin
q f (q)dq = E(q)  Prob(q > q˜)

E(q) +
D  #
h + 1

(3)
and Z q˜
qmin
q2 f (q)dq = Var(q) +E(q)2   Prob(q > q˜)

q2max  
2#qmax
h + 1
+
#2
2h + 1

, (4)
where
E(q) =
hqmax + qmin
h + 1
and Var(q) = D
2h2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)
.
By Lemma 1, the average over the interval [qˆ, qmax] can be calculated as
E[q j q > qˆ] 4=
R qmax
qˆ
q f (q)dq
1  F(qˆ) = E(q) +
qˆ   qmin
h + 1
=
hqmax + qˆ
h + 1
, (5)
where the second equality follows because D  # = (qmax   qmin)  (qmax   qˆ) = qˆ   qmin in Eq.(3).
I now describe the salesperson’s optimization program that is similar to the most of the literature. The
salesperson is assumed to be risk-averse. The worker’s risk averse preferences are represented by a negative
exponential utility function of the form u(w) =   exp( rw) as a function of his end-of-period compensation
w, where r > 0 is his constant absolute risk aversion coefficient. The disutility function to the salesperson
of exerting effort level e is denoted by C(e). For tractability, I assume a specific functional form for the cost
of effort, and it is captured by a quadratic function C(e) = e22k for some k > 0. Here, 1k is the marginal
disutility of effort. The assumption of a quadratic disutility function is made for expositional convenience.
As the standard argument, his certainty equivalent is approximately given by CE  E(z)  r2Var(z), where
z = w  C(e) is the worker’s net payoff.9 The salesperson then maximizes his certainty equivalent. Under a
linear contract w(y) = a+ by, his certainty equivalent can be written as CE = a+ b(gq+ e) C(e)  rs22 b2.
The risk averse agent bears a disutility from uncertainty captured by the risk premium term rs2b2/2. In
addition, the reservation wage or the minimum certainty equivalent of the salesperson is denoted by w¯ > 0.
I assume that the reservation wage does not depend on the private information.10
9The certainty equivalent can be approximately by CE  z¯  12 r(z¯)Var(z), where r(z¯) =  u00(z¯)/u0(z¯) and z¯ = E(z). When
the compensation scheme is given by w(y) = a + by = a + b(g(e, q) + #), the expectation of the net utility with respect to
# is given by E(z) = a + bg(e, q)   C(e), and hence z   E(z) = b#. Moreover, the variance of the net utility is given by
Var(z) = E((z E(z))2) = E((b#)2) = b2E(#2) = b2Var(#) = b2s2. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p.247) for more details.
10In contrast, Dutta (2008) assumed that the salesperson’s reservation wage has the form of w(q) = w¯+ lgq for some l > 0.
3 MENU OF LINEAR CONTRACTS 8/52
Finally, define d = kgh and l = dD = kghD for convenience. The parameter l can be regarded as a measure
of the amount of asymmetric information and the degree of worker heterogeneity in the response function. It
becomes a negligible factor when either the difference D = qmax   qmin or the marginal product g of worker
heterogeneity q in the response function tends to infinity.
3 Menu of Linear Contracts
To start this section, I shall consider the fixed wage contract as a benchmark. If the firm sets a fixed wage,
then it is not difficult to see that the worker does not exert any effort, and thus, the optimal fixed wage will
equal to the reservation wage based on the binding participation constraint. The firm’s maximized expected
profit will be written as
Z qmax
qmin
[y  w¯] f (q)dq = g
Z qmax
qmin
q f (q)dq   w¯ = gE(q)  w¯ = g(hqmax + qmin)
h + 1
  w¯.
As a consequence, the firm’s expected profit under the optimal fixed wage is given by
Ep f w(g, h)
4
=
g(hqmax + qmin)
h + 1
  w¯.
The firm can choose more complex wage schedule to maximize his expected profit subject to the worker’s
optimizing behavior. The effort of the salesperson is not observable and hence not contractible. I restrict
focus to a menu of linear compensation schemes fam`hi, bm`hig of the form wm`(q, y) = am`(q) + bm`(q)y
with the pay-performance sensitivity bm`(q) restricted to be non-negative as in the literature (see Bernardo
et al, 2001; Dutta, 2008; Dutta and Fan, 2014; Reichelstein, 1992). The contact is linear in y but the two
components am`(q) and bm`(q) can be non-linear functions of the reported type q. A menu of linear contracts
are designed to elicit each worker’s type and to motivate each worker to take a desired action for the firm.
To express the incentive compatibility constraint, define CEm`(qˆ, q) as the certainty equivalent of the worker
of type q who reports type qˆ:
CEm`(qˆ, q)
4
= am`(qˆ) + bm`(qˆ)(gq + em`(qˆ))  C(em`(qˆ))  rs
2
2
bm`(qˆ)
2, (6)
where
em`(qˆ) 2 argmax

am`(qˆ) + bm`(qˆ)(gq + e)  C(e)  rs
2
2
bm`(qˆ)
2 j e > 0

.
Also, define CEm`(q) = CEm`(qˆ, q) as the utility from reporting the true type q. Then, the incentive
compatibility constraint is CEm`(q) > CEm`(qˆ, q) for every pair (q, qˆ), and the participation constraint is
given by CEm`(q) > w¯ for every q. In terms of the information rent in excess of the reservation wage w¯, define
Rm`(qˆ, q)
4
= CEm`(qˆ, q)   w¯ and Rm`(q) 4= CEm`(q)   w¯. The incentive compatibility and participation
constraints are both taken into account by the firm in its profit maximization problem. Any form of direct
revelation mechanism is said to be feasible if it satisfies both types of constraints. Similar to Dutta (2008),
I have the following result. The proof is omitted.
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Lemma 2 (feasible contracts). A direct revelation mechanism ham`(), bm`()i, where wm`(q, y) = am`(q) +
bm`(q)y, satisfies (IC) Rm`(q) > Rm`(qˆ, q) and (IR) Rm`(q) > 0 for every q if and only if R˙m`(q) = bm`(q)g,
Rm`(qmin) > 0, and bm`() is non-decreasing.
The standard arguments yield the following pay-performance sensitivity and the effort function as a direct
revelation mechanism.
Proposition 1 (incentive-intensity under the menu of linear contracts). The optimal pay-performance sensi-
tivity is given by
bm`(q) = max

k
k+ rs2

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)

, 0

. (7)
Moreover, The optimal effort function is the following:
em`(q) = maxfbm`(q)k, 0g
Denote the corresponding production rule by ym`(q) = gq + em`(q) under the menu of linear contracts.
Recall that the incentive compatibility constraint requires a weak monotonicity of the pay-performance
sensitivity. Substituting the inverse hazard rate (1   F(q))/ f (q) = h(qmax   q) into Eq.(7), the pay-
performance sensitivity is written as
bm`(q) =
k
k+ rs2

1  gh(qmax   q)
k

=
k  gh(qmax   q)
k+ rs2
.
This implies that the weak monotonicity is guaranteed without any additional assumption because b˙m`(q) =
maxf ghk+rs2 , 0g > 0 over the interval [qmin, qmax]. However, the non-negativity of the pay-performance
sensitivity itself requires additional restrictions on the parameters. Notice that bm`(q) > 0 holds when the
expression inside round brackets in Eq.(7) is positive:
1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)
= 1  g
k
h(qmax   q) > 0 () q > qmax   k
gh
.
Indeed, em`(q) > 0 for every q > qm`min, where the marginal type is given by qm`min
4
= qmax   k/gh. In other
words, a sufficient condition for that all of types exert positive effort is that qm`min < qmin. This condition can be
written as qm`min < qmin () qmax   qmin < k/gh () D < k/gh () k > ghD () l = k/ghD > 1.
In other words, the existence of a bunching in the menu of linear contracts is determined whether the
parameter l is bounded from below or the degree of asymmetric information D is bounded from above.11
It is convenient to characterize the relevant parameters in terms of (h,l) instead of (g, h). I use them
interchangeably.
Proposition 2 (bunching under the menu of linear contracts). There is no bunching (resp. there is a bunching)
in the menu of linear contracts in Proposition 1 if l > 1 (resp. l 6 1).
11If k  ghD > 0 then 0 < k  gh(qmax   qmin) 6 k  gh(qmax   q) for every q > qmin.
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I shall derive the maximized expected profit under the menu of linear contracts derived in Proposition
1. The firm’s objective function to be maximized is given by
Z qmax
qmin
[ym`(q)  fam`(q) + bm`(q)ym`(q)g] f (q)dq.
I can use the fact that Rm`(qmin) = 0 to obtain the total payment to type q:
am`(q) + bm`(q)ym`(q) = Rm`(q) + C(em`(q)) +
rs2
2
bm`(q)
2 + w¯
=
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(em`(q)) +
rs2
2
bm`(q)
2 + w¯.
Get back into the firm’s objective to obtain
Z qmax
qmin

ym`(q) 
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds  C(em`(q))  rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2

f (q)dq   w¯.
The expression for the double integral can be written as
Z qmax
qmin
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds

f (q)dq
=
Z qmax
qmin
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds

d
dq
(F(q)  1)) dq
=
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds

(F(q)  1)) jqmaxqmin  
Z qmax
qmin
bm`(q)g (F(q)  1)) dq
=
Z qmax
qmin
(1  F(q))bm`(q)gdq.
Therefore, the firm’s objective function is summarized as
Z qmax
qmin
pm`(q) f (q)dq   w¯,
where the profit contribution of type q is represented as
pm`(q)
4
= gq + em`(q)  1  F(q)f (q) bm`(q)g  C(em`(q)) 
rs2
2
bm`(q)
2. (8)
Substituting em`(q) = bm`(q)k into Eq.(8), I conclude that pm`(q) = gq for every q 6 qm`min, whereas for
every q > qm`min,
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pm`(q) = gq + bm`(q)k  1  F(q)f (q) bm`(q)g 
bm`(q)
2k
2
  rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2
= gq + bm`(q)k

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)

  k+ rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2
= gq +
k2
k+ rs2

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)
2
  k+ rs
2
2

k
k+ rs2
2 
1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)
2
= gq +
k2
2(k+ rs2)

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)
2
. (9)
Substituting the expression of the inverse hazard rate (1   F(q))/ f (q) = h(qmax   q) into Eq.(9), I
obtain
pm`(q) = gq +
k2
2(k+ rs2)

1  gh(qmax   q)
k
2
= gq +
(k  gh(qmax   q))2
2(k+ rs2)
. (10)
I am ready to find the maximized firm’s expected profit under a menu of linear compensation schemes.
In the following computation, I use the following facts from Lemma 1:
E(q) =
hqmax + qmin
h + 1
and Var(q) = h
2D2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)
.
Firstly, if there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l > 1), then the firm’s expected profit
can be written as
Epm`(g, h,l) jl>1
=
Z qmax
qmin
pm`(q) f (q)dq   w¯
= gE(q)  w¯+ 1
2(k+ rs2)
Z qmax
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq
= Ep f w(g, h) +
1
2(k+ rs2)

(k  ghqmax)2 + 2gh(k  ghqmax)E(q) + g2h2E(q2)

= Ep f w(g, h) +
(k  ghqmax + ghE(q)))2 + g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(k  gh(qmax  E(q)))2 + g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
. (11)
The second term on the right-hand side in Eq.(11) can be written as a form of the variance of q. Since
qmax  E(q) = qmax   hqmax+qminh+1 = Dh+1 , it follows that
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(k  g(qmax  E(q)))2 =

k  ghD
h + 1
2
= (ghD)2

k
ghD
  1
h + 1
2
= (ghD)2

l  1
h + 1
2
= (ghD)2

(h + 1)l  1
h + 1
2
.
Therefore, the maximized expected profit under the menu of linear contracts in which there is no bunching
(l > 1) is given by
Epml(g, h,l) jl>1 = Ep f w(g, h) + (ghD)
2
2(k+ rs2)

(h + 1)l  1
h + 1
2
+
g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
= Ep f w(g, h) +

(2h + 1)g2((h + 1)l  1)2
2(k+ rs2)

h2D2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)

+
g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(2h + 1)g2((h + 1)l  1)2
2(k+ rs2)
Var(q) + g
2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
.
Finally, I conclude that when there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l > 1), the maximized
expected profit is given by Eq.(12).
Proposition 3 (maximized profit under the menu of linear contracts if there is no bunching). If l > 1 then
there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts, and the firm earns the expected profit given in Eq.(12):
Epm`(g, h,l) jl>1= Ep f w(g, h) + g
2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)

(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2

. (12)
It remains to compute the maximized expected profit in which there is a bunching (l 6 1). If l 6 1
then there is a bunching in bm`(), and hence in em`(). That is, less productive workers will not exert any
effort. The profit contribution of type q in Eq.(10) is given by
pm`(q) = gq + bm`(q)k

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)

  k+ rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2   w¯
=
8>><>>:
gq   w¯ for q 6 qm`min,
gq   w¯+ (k  gh(qmax   q))
2
2(k+ rs2)
for q > qm`min.
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Therefore, the principal’s expected profit is as follows:
Epm`(g, h,l) jl61
=
Z qm`min
qmin
gq f (q)dq +
Z qmax
qm`min

gq +
(k  gh(qmax   q))2
2(k+ rs2)

f (q)dq   w¯
=
Z qmax
qmin
gq f (q)dq +
Z qmax
qm`min
(k  gh(qmax   q))2
2(k+ rs2)
f (q)dq   w¯
= gE(q)  w¯+ (k  gh(qmax  E(q)))
2 + g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
  1
2(k+ rs2)
Z qm`min
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq
= Epm`(g, h) jl>1   12(k+ rs2)
Z qm`min
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq. (13)
Eventually, the right-hand side in Eq.(13) can be simplified as in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (maximized profit under the menu of linear contracts if there is a bunching). If l 6 1 then
there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts, and the firm earns the expected profit given in Eq.(14):
Epm`(g, h,l) jl61= Ep f w(g, h) + (h + 1)g
2h2
k+ rs2
l
2h+1
h Var(q). (14)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
In this section, I have focused on the menu of linear contracts that is a direct revelation mechanism as a
function of private information. In Section 6.2, an economic interpretation of such menu of linear contracts
will be discussed. More precisely, I shall investigate the implementability of the menu of linear contracts
through a single and anonymous compensation plan as a function of performance.
4 Quota-based Compensation Scheme
In this section, I shall construct a particular piece-wise linear compensation scheme referred to as a quota-
based contract. The purpose of the paper is not to derive the fully optimal quota-based compensation
scheme.12 I assume that the firm intends to set a quota-based compensation scheme given in Eq.(15) whose
the fixed salary component is predetermined:
12A class of quota-based contracts may allow for more than two kinks. For instance, a quota-based contract with bounded
payments is considered in Chen and Miller (2009). They employ numerical simulations to compare the relative performance
of linear contracts with piece-wise-linear-threshold contracts in the case where the worker chooses actions over time. Their
contract can be regarded as a menu of two fixed salaries and a piece-rate contract, described as
w(y) =
8><>:
a if y 6 q
a+ b(y  q) if q < y 6 c
a+ b(c  q) if y > c.
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wqb(y) = w¯+ bqb maxf0, y  yqbg for some bqb > 0 and yqb > 0. (15)
The coefficient bqb represents the piece-rate paid for each unit of performance beyond the quota yqb. The
quota-based contract defined in Eq.(15) is a piece-wise linear compensation plan, so that productive workers
benefit from a higher once their output surpass the certain threshold.
It must be emphasized that such contract is not a direct revelation mechanism as a function of type of
the worker. The firm cannnot condition the contract on the worker’s type. Since the quota yqb is assumed
to be positive, the quota-based compensation scheme can be considered as a ”menu” of the fixed-payment
contract w¯ and a corresponding piece-rate compensation scheme w˜pr(y) = aqb + bqby as illustrated in Figure
2. In other words, the original quota-based compensation scheme is the upper boundary of the two simple
contracts, wqb(y) = maxfw¯, w˜pr(y)g, as depicted in Figure 2.13 Here, the vertical intercept aqb must satisfy
w¯  aqb = bqbyqb.
y
w
0 yqb
w˜pr(y) = αqb + βqby
w¯
αqb
βqb
Figure 2: Quota-based contract as a menu of simple contracts
If the worker of type q chooses the fixed wage contract then the resulting payoff will be CE = w¯, and
so his information rent is zero. On the other hand, the information rent under a piece-rate compensation
scheme w˜qb(y) is given by
Rpr(q)
4
= aqb + bqb(gq + e)  C(e)  rs
2
2
b2qb   w¯. (16)
Because of the quadratic form of the disutility function C(e) = e22k , the implied effort level is e = bqbk.
Substituting this effort level into Eq.(16), I have
Rpr(q) = aqb + bqb(gq + bqbk) 
b2qbk
2
  rs
2
2
b2qb   w¯ = aqb + bqbgq +
k  rs2
2
b2qb   w¯. (17)
13If the base component aqb is strictly higher than the reservation wage w¯, then the quota-level yqb of output is strictly
negative. However, it is not optimal for the firm to set aqb > w¯, and hence I shall pay attention to the case that w¯ > aqb or
equivalently yqb > 0.
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The worker of type q will choose the piece-rate incentive scheme only if the expression in Eq.(17) is strictly
positive because the information rent under the fixed-wage contract is zero. The information rent of the
marginal type qqbmin exactly equals zero, as well as each type q 6 q
qb
min. Every type q > q
qb
min enjoys a positive
information rent. Therefore, the participation constraint under the quota-based contract is described by
Rqb(q)
4
= max

0,Rpr(q)
	
> 0. (18)
Thus, contracts will serve the dual purpose of sorting workers and providing incentives.
Since the information rent is strictly increasing (R˙qb(q) = bqbg > 0) as long as the worker chose the piece-
rate contract, there must a unique value qqbmin such that Rqb(q
qb
min) = 0. At this moment, the marginal worker
type qqbmin does not necessarily belong to the type space. There are several possible cases to be considered.
If qqbmin < qmin then it must be the case that Rpr(qmin) > 0, which implies that the firm can improve his
expected profit by choosing a lower fixed component aqb to all of types without altering their actions. This
case is ruled out, and thus I pay attention to the case of qmin 6 qqbmin or equivalently Rpr(qmin) 6 0 with
equality only if qmin = qqbmin. Firstly, no type would choose the fixed wage contract when qmin = q
qb
min.
Secondly, there are two subcases to be considered when qmin < qqbmin or Rpr(qmin) < 0. If Rpr(qmax) > 0
then it must be the case that qqbmin belongs to the type space so that qmin < q
qb
min < qmax. On the other
hand, if Rpr(qmax) 6 0 then it must be the case that qqbmin > qmax. In the latter situation, the quota-based
contract is dominated by the sole fixed wage contract, however, this case never happens.14 In what follows,
I may restrict my attention to the case that qmin 6 qqbmin < qmax.
I assume that the marginal worker type qqbmin prefers the fixed wage contract w¯ to the piece-rate contract
w˜qb(y), although he is indifferent between the two simple contracts. Eventually, the effort level under the
menu of simple contracts is the following:
eqb(q) =
8<: bqbk if Rpr(q) > 0,0 if Rpr(q) 6 0.
The corresponding output plan is given by yqb(q) = gq + eqb(q).
Suppose now that qmin < qqbmin or equivalently Rpr(qmin) < 0. From the binding participation constraint
Rpr(q
qb
min) = 0 for the marginal worker type q
qb
min, the fixed component of the quota-based compensation
scheme is determined as
aqb = w¯ 

bqbgq
qb
min +
k  rs2
2
b2qb

. (19)
Therefore, the profit contribution of each type q > qqbmin of the worker whose effort level is eqb(q) = bqbk
(who chose the piece-rate contract) becomes:
14See Proposition 6. The quota-based contract is strictly superior to the fixed-wage contract.
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pqb(q) = yqb(q)  w˜pr(yqb(q)) = gq + eqb(q)  (aqb + bqb(gq + eqb(q)))
= (1  bqb)(gq + bqbk)  aqb
= (1  bqb)(gq + bqbk) + bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb   w¯.
On the other hand, the profit contribution of each type q < qqbmin of the worker whose effort level is eqb(q) = 0
(who chose the fixed wage scheme) becomes:
pqb(q) = gq   w¯.
Now, I rewrite the firm’s expected profit as a function of the pay-performance sensitivity bqb and the
marginal worker type qqbmin:
Epqb(bqb, q
qb
min) =
Z qqbmin
qmin
[gq   w¯] f (q)dq
+
Z qmax
q
qb
min

(1  bqb)(gq + bqbk) + bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb   w¯

f (q)dq
= g
Z qqbmin
qmin
q f (q)dq + (1  bqb)g
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq
+

(1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb
 Z qmax
q
qb
min
f (q)dq   w¯
= gE(q)  w¯  bqbg
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq (20)
+

(1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb

(1  F(qqbmin)). (21)
The first-order condition that characterizes the optimal component of the piece-rate incentive scheme are
the following. The first-order conditions with respect to bqb is as follows:
0 =
¶Epqb(bqb, q
qb
min)
¶bqb
=  g
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq +

k  2bqbk+ gqqbmin + (k  rs2)bqb

(1  F(qqbmin))
=  g
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq +

k+ gqqbmin   (k+ rs2)bqb

(1  F(qqbmin)).
This yields that
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g
R qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq
1  F(qqbmin)
= k+ gqqbmin   (k+ rs2)bqb. (22)
Solving Eq.(22) for bqb to get
bqb =
k+ gqqbmin   g
R qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))
k+ rs2
=
k  g
R qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin

k+ rs2
(23)
=
k
k+ rs2

1  g
k

E[q j q > qqbmin]  qqbmin

. (24)
Here, I would like to check under what condition the incentive sensitivity bqb is positive indeed. Since
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ = hqmax+qˆh+1   qˆ = h(qmax qˆ)h+1 by Eq.(5), it follows that 1  gk
 
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ is minimized
at qˆ = qmin. I see that the expression in the right-hand side in Eq.(24) evaluated at qqbmin = qmin is positive
if k > g(E(q)  qmin) holds. Notice that
g(E(q)  qmin) = g

hqmax + qmin
h + 1
  qmin

= g

hqmax + qmin   (h + 1)qmin
h + 1

=
ghD
h + 1
,
and hence a sufficient condition for that the incentive sensitivity bqb is positive restricts an upper bound for
the parameter l:
k > g(E(q)  qmin) () l = k
ghD
>
1
h + 1
. (25)
Next, the first-order condition with respect to qqbmin is the following:
0 =
¶Epqb(bqb, q
qb
min)
¶q
qb
min
= bqbgq
qb
min f (q
qb
min) + bqbg(1  F(qqbmin)) 

(1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb

f (qqbmin) (26)
= bqbg(1  F(qqbmin)) 

(1  bqb)bqbk+ k  rs
2
2
b2qb

f (qqbmin). (27)
Dividing the both sides of Eq.(26) by bqb f (qqbmin), I have
g
 
1  F(qqbmin)
f (qqbmin)
!
= (1  bqb)k+ k  rs
2
2
bqb =
2k  2bqbk+ bqbk  rs2bqb
2
=
2k  (k+ rs2)bqb
2
,
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and then,
2gh(qmax   qqbmin) = 2k  (k+ rs2)bqb. (28)
Substituting Eq.(23) into Eq.(28) to get
2gh(qmax   qqbmin) = 2k 
 
k  g
 Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin
!!
= k+ g
 Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin
!
,
and then,
2gh(qmax   qqbmin)  k
g
=
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin.
Here, by Lemma 1, the truncated mean over the interval [qabmin, qmax] is expressed as
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin)) =
hqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
.
Then,
2gh(qmax   qqbmin)  k
g
=
hqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
  qqbmin =
h(qmax   qqbmin)
h + 1
. (29)
Solving Eq.(29) for the marginal type qqbmin to get15
q
qb
min = qmax  
k(h + 1)
gh(2h + 1)
.
As I assumed, the marginal type qqbmin cannot be lower than the lowest type qmin. The requirement
q
qb
min > qmin is guaranteed if 2h+1h+1 > l holds.16 That is, the ratio l = kghD is supposed to be bounded from
15Eq.(29) yields that (qmax   qqbmin)

2h   hh+1

= (qmax   qqbmin)
2h(h+1) h
h+1 = (qmax   qqbmin)
h(2h+1)
h+1 =
k
g . Solving this for
qmax   qqbmin to get qmax   q
qb
min =
k
g  h+1h(2h+1) =
k(h+1)
gh(2h+1) . Here, q
qb
min > q
m`
min = qmax   kgh for any h > 0 because q
qb
min =
qmax   k(h+1)gh(2h+1) > qmax   kgh = qm`min. Therefore, the sorting effect under the quota-based contract is stronger than that under
the menu of linear contracts.
16Notice that qqbmin > qmin () D = qmax   qmin > qmax   q
qb
min =
k(h+1)
gh(2h+1) is guaranteed if
2h+1
h+1 > kghD = l holds.
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above, as is depicted in Figure 3. Recall that if the condition l > 1h+1 does not hold, the problem would
be uninteresting because it is optimal for the firm to set the fixed-payment contract only. Putting together
the two restrictions on the set of parameters, the relevant set of parameters in terms of (h,l) so that the
quota-based contract is well-defined is denoted by
Aqb =

(h,l) j 2h + 1
h + 1
> l > 1
h + 1

.
η
λ
2η+1
η+1 > λ
1
1
1.5
0
βqb > 0 and θ
qb
min
> θmin
λ > 1η+1
0.5
Aqb
Figure 3: Admissible parameters for quota-based compensation scheme
It remains to calculate the expression of the pay-performance sensitivity bqb. Substituting qmax  qqbmin =
k(h+1)
gh(2h+1) into Eq.(23) to get
bqb =
k  g
R qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin

k+ rs2
(30)
=
k  k2h+1
k+ rs2
=
((2h + 1)  1)k
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)
=
2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)
because the expression in the round brackets in Eq.(30) is written as
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq/(1  F(qqbmin))  qqbmin =
h(qmax   qqbmin)
h + 1
=
h
h + 1
 k(h + 1)
gh(2h + 1)
=
k
g(2h + 1)
.
It turns out that the pay-performance sensitivity bqb of the quota-based contract is positive indeed. In
addition, the marginal worker type qqbmin would produce the amount yqb(q
qb
min) = gq
qb
min because he chose the
fixed-wage contract. It turns out that any type q > qqbmin has an incentive to produce more than the quota
yqb. Recall that w¯  aqb = bqbyqb, as shown in Figure 2. Also, w¯  aqb = bqbgqqbmin + k rs
2
2 b
2
qb from Eq.(19).
Combining these equations, I have
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yqb = gq
qb
min +
k  rs2
2
bqb.
Finally, I conclude that any type q > qqbmin (who prefers the piece-rate contract to the fixed-wage contract)
produces the output yqb(q) = gq+ bqbk > gqqbmin+ k rs
2
2 bqb = yqb because
k rs2
2 bqb <
k
2bqb < bqbk holds.17
Proposition 5 (incentive-intensity under the quota-based contract). Suppose that 2h+1h+1 > l. The quota-based
contract considered as the menu of fixed wage and piece rate contracts is given by
wqb(y) = w¯+ bqb maxf0, y  yqbg, where
bqb =
2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)
and yqb = gqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
bqb.
The corresponding marginal type is given by qqbmin = qmax  k(h+1)gh(2h+1) > qmin with equality only if
2h+1
h+1 = l.18
From Eq.(20) and Eq.(21), the maximized profit under the quota-based contract as a function of the
incentive sensitivity bqb and the marginal worker type qqbmin can be written as
Epqb(bqb, q
qb
min)
= gE(q)  w¯
 bqbg
Z qmax
q
qb
min
q f (q)dq +

(1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb

(1  F(qqbmin))
= Ep f w(g, h)  bqbg(1  F(qqbmin))
 
hqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
!
+

(1  bqb)bqbk+ bgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb

(1  F(qqbmin))
= Ep f w(g, h) +
 
 bqbghqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
+ (1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb
!
(1  F(qqbmin)). (31)
The expression of the inside the round brackets in Eq.(31) is written as
17For q < qqbmin, the output y(q) = gq could be higher or lower than the quota yqb because the sign of k  rs2 is indeterminate.
18If 2h+1h+1 = l then the marginal type q
qb
min coincides with the lowest type qmin: if
2h+1
h+1 = l then q
qb
min = qmax  
k(h+1)
gh(2h+1) =
qmax   dl = qmin + D  dl = qmin + D  dd/D = qmin.
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 bqbghqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
+ (1  bqb)bqbk+ bqbgqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
b2qb
= bqb
 
 ghqmax + q
qb
min
h + 1
+ (1  bqb)k+ gqqbmin +
k  rs2
2
bqb
!
= bqb
 
 ghqmax   gqqbmin + g(h + 1)qqbmin
h + 1
+ k  k+ rs
2
2
bqb
!
= bqb
 
 gh(qmax   qqbmin)
h + 1
+ k  k+ rs
2
2
bqb
!
=
2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)
  gh
h + 1

k(h + 1)
gh(2h + 1)

+ k 

k+ rs2
2

2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)

=
2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)

  k
2h + 1
+ k  hk
2h + 1

=
2hk
(2h + 1)(k+ rs2)
 k+ (2h + 1)k  hk
2h + 1

=
2h2k2
(2h + 1)2(k+ rs2)
.
Therefore, the maximized expected profit under the quota-based contract will be written as
Epqb(bqb, q
qb
min) = Ep f w(g, h) +
2h2k2
(2h + 1)2(k+ rs2)
 
qmax   qqbmin
D
! 1
h
= Ep f w(g, h) +
0@ 2(k(h + 1)) 2h+1h
D
2h+1
h (2h + 1)(k+ rs2)(gh(2h + 1))
1
h
1A D2h2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)

= Ep f w(g, h) +
2(k/ghD)
1
h k2(h + 1)
2h+1
h
(k+ rs2)D2(2h + 1)
h+1
h
Var(q)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
2l
1
h (k/ghD)2(gh)2(h + 1)
2h+1
h
(k+ rs2)(2h + 1)
h+1
h
Var(q)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
2l
2h+1
h (h + 1)
2h+1
h g2h2
(k+ rs2)(2h + 1)
h+1
h
Var(q).
Proposition 6 (maximized profit udner the quota-based contract). If 2h+1h+1 > l then the maximized expected
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profit under the quota-based contract is given by
Epqb(g, h,l) = Ep f w(g, h) +
2l
2h+1
h (h + 1)
2h+1
h g2h2
(k+ rs2)(2h + 1)
h+1
h
Var(q). (32)
In particular, if the parameter l attains the upper bound 2h+1h+1 = l, then the maximized expected profit
can be simplified to the following:
Epqb

g, h, 2h+1h+1

= Ep f w(g, h) +
2(2h + 1)g2h2
k+ rs2
Var(q).
Notice that I have obtained the maximized expected profit under the ”restricted” quota-based contract
with the predetermined fixed-wage component given in Eq.(15). An ”unrestricted” quota-based contract
may earn more than the maximized expected profit in Eq.(32), however, it is shown that such restricted
quota-based contract is enough to secure a substantial gain relative to the menu of linear contracts in Section
5.1.
5 Comparison of Performances of Simple Contracts
I begin by analyzing the performance of the quota-based contract constructed in Section 4. I focus on the
incremental gain achieved under the quota-based contract beyond the fixed-wage contract. The performance
measure I employ is the ratio of the incremental gain under the quota-based contract divided by the in-
cremental gain under the menu of linear contracts. I shall derive an analytical expression for such relative
performance measure in order to provide explicit upper and lower bounds on the relative performance. I
adopt the same strategy to examine the relative performance of the optimal piece-rate contract. My findings
below may provide an explanation for the use of a piece-wise-linear-threshold contract in practice although
several researchers have pointed out negative effects of quota(s).
5.1 Performance of quota-based compensation scheme
The subsection analyzes the performance measurement of the quota-based contract as a menu of simple
contracts derived in the previous section. Tractable and analytical upper and lower bounds on such mea-
surement can be explicitly derived under the specific distribution function of private information I consider.
This is the incremental gain relative to the optimal fixed wage defined by [Epqb  Ep f w]/[Epm`  Ep f w],
rather than the ratio of Epqb to Epm`.19 It turns out that the relative incremental gain as be viewed as a
function of h and l:
19In the literature on the procurement contract, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) demonstrate that simple
binary menus secure a substantial share of the gains achieved by the fully optimal contract. Rogerson (2003) uses a menu of a
fixed price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract (FPCR), whereas Chu and Sappington (2007) uses (LCSCR), a menu
of a linear cost-sharing contract (i.e., two-part tariff) and cost-reimbursement contract.
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fqb(h,l) =
Epqb(g, h,l) Ep f w(g, h)
Epm`(g, h,l) Ep f w(g, h) (33)
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h l
2h+1
h
(2h + 1)
h+1
h ((2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2)
if 2h+1h+1 > l > 1,
2

h + 1
2h + 1
 h+1
h
if 1h+1 < l 6 1.
(34)
The function fqb(h,l) is continuous in l.20 The relevant set of parameters Aqb can be decomposed into
two regions, as depicted in Figure 4.
η
λ
2η+1
η+1 > λ
1
1
1.5
0
λ > 1η+1
Bunching region
No-bunching region
Aqb |λ>1= {(η, λ) | 1 < λ 6
2η+1
η+1 }
Aqb |λ61= {(η, λ) |
1
η+1 < λ 6 1}
Figure 4: Decomposition of the relevant parameters
Firstly, I consider the case in which there is no-bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l > 1). The
relative incremental gain will be calculated as
fqb(h,l) j 2h+1
h+1 >l>1
=
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h l
2h+1
h
(2h + 1)
h+1
h ((2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2)
. (35)
I shall examine whether fqb(h,l) jl>1 is increasing or decreasing in l for each h. The derivative of the
relevant part of the function fqb(h,l) jl>1 is the following:
20Notice that when 2h+1h+1 > l > 1, liml!1 fqb(h,l) =
4h2(h+1)
2h+1
h+1
2(2h+1)
h+1
h (h+1)h2
= 2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h .
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¶
¶l
0@ l 2h+1h
(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2
1A
=
(2h + 1)l
h+1
h
h((2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2)  
2(h + 1)(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)l
2h+1
h
((2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2)2
=
(2h + 1)l
h+1
h
h((2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2)

1  2h(h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)l
(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2

. (36)
The expression inside the round brackets in Eq.(36) is strictly positive in Aqb jl>1 because (2h + 1)((h +
1)l   1)2 + h2   2h(h + 1)((h + 1)l   1)l = (h + 1)2(l   1)2 > 0. Recall that (h,l) is restricted to
2h+1
h+1 > l > 1 now. Therefore, given h, the upper bound within the relevant region Aqb jl>1 of parameter
values is attained as l ! 2h+1h+1 , while the lower bound as l ! 1. The value of the upper bound on
fqb (h,l) jl>1 is written as
fqb

h,
2h + 1
h + 1

j 2h+1
h+1 >l>1
=
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h

2h+1
h+1
 2h+1
h
(2h + 1)
2h+1
h ((2h + 1)(2h + 1  1)2 + h2)
=
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h   2h+1h (2h + 1)
2h+1
h   h+1h
h2(4(2h + 1) + 1)
=
4(2h + 1)
4(2h + 1) + 1
=
8h + 4
8h + 5
2 (0.8, 1).
On the other hand, the value of the lower bound on fqb(h,l) jl>1 is written as
fqb(h, 1) j 2h+1
h+1 >l>1
=
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h
(2h + 1)
h+1
h ((2h + 1)h2 + h2)
=
4h2(h + 1)
2h+1
h
2h2(h + 1)(2h + 1)
h+1
h
= 2

h + 1
2h + 1
 h+1
h
=
2
e
 0.73 as h ! 0,
since lim
h!0

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h
= 1/e  0.367879. These observations are summarized as follows:
8>><>>:
sup
h
fqb(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
= fqb

h, 2h+1h+1

= 8h+48h+5 ,
inf
h
fqb(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
= fqb(h, 1) = 2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h .
(37)
It turns out that the quota-based contract performs well if there is no bunching in the menu of linear
contracts, as shown in Figure 5.
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η
1
φqb(η, λ)
0 1
0.8
2/e ≈ 0.73
Upper Bound φqb
(
η,
2η+1
η+1
)
| 2η+1
η+1 >λ>1
= 8η+48η+5
Lower Bound φqb(η, 1) | 2η+1
η+1 >λ>1
= 2
(
η+1
2η+1
) η+1
η
Figure 5: fqb(h,l) when there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts
Proposition 7 (performance of the quota-based contract). Suppose that there is no bunching in the menu of
linear contracts (l > 1). The relative incremental gain varies from 2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h to 8h+48h+5 for each first-order
stochastic dominance shift parameter h. Approximately, the lower bound is higher than 2/e  0.73.
Table 1 summaries the upper and the lower bounds on the relative incremental gain for several values of
h. The performance of the quota-based contract varies and increases as the distribution of the productivity
of workers becomes more favorable to the firm. In particular, the quota-based contract can secure more
than 88 percent of the gain secured under the menu of linear contracts when the worker’s type is distributed
uniformly.
h
0 0.1 0.2 0.4 1 2 4 10
upper bounds 0.8 0.827586 0.848485 0.878049 0.923077 0.952381 0.0.972973 0.988235
lower bounds 0.735759 0.76799 0.793139 0.829897 0.888889 0.929516 0.959267 0.982021
Table 1: The relative incremental gain of the quota-based contract ([Epqb  Ep f w]/[Epm`  Ep f w]) when
there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts
To end this subsection, it remains to consider the case in which there is a bunching in the menu of linear
contracts (l 6 1). The relative incremental gain will be calculated as
fqb(h,l) j 1
h+1<l61
= 2

h + 1
2h + 1
 h+1
h
. (38)
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Notice that this is equal to fqb(h, 1). It turns out that the above gain is independent of l.
η
φqb(η, 1) | 1
η+1<λ61
= 2
(
η+1
2η+1
) η+1
η
1
1
0
8
9
≈ 0.889
φqb(0, 1) | 1
η+1<λ61
= 2e ≈ 0.73
φqb(η, λ)
Figure 6: fqb(h,l) when there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts
Proposition 8 (performance of the quota-based contract). When there is a bunching in the menu of lin-
ear contracts, the relative incremental gain is given by 2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h for each (h,l). The lowest relative
incremental gain 2/e  0.73 is achieved when h tends to zero.
From Propositions 7 and 8, I conclude that the quota-based contract can always secure a substantial
portion (at least 2/e  73 percent) of the incremental gain secured by the optimal menu of linear contracts
over the entire region of the relevant parameter values.
5.2 Performance of piece-rate incentive scheme
For comparison, I shall consider the situation in which the firm can offer a single piece-rate contract. As a
corollary of Proposition 6, the expected profit to be maximized under the piece-rate incentive scheme can
be obtained by taking the limit of Eq.(20) and Eq.(21) as qqbmin ! qmin:
Eppr(bpr) = gE(q)  w¯  bprgE(q) + (1  bpr)bprk+ bprgqmin + k  rs
2
2
b2pr
= (1  bpr)gE(q) + (1  bpr)bprk+ bprgqmin + k  rs
2
2
b2pr   w¯, (39)
and the corresponding incentive sensitivity is given by
bpr =
k  g(E(q)  qmin)
k+ rs2
. (40)
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Eq.(40) can be obtained from the first-order condition for Eq.(39) as well.21 Then, the maximized
expected profit can be written as
Eppr(bpr) = gE(q)  w¯  bprgE(q) + (1  bpr)bprk+ bprgqmin + k  rs
2
2
b2pr
= Ep f w(g, h) + bprk  bprgE(q)  b2prk+ bprgqmin +
k  rs2
2
b2pr
= Ep f w(g, h) + (k  g(E(q)  qmin))bpr   k+ rs
2
2
b2pr
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(k  g(E(q)  qmin))2
k+ rs2
  k+ rs
2
2
(k  g(E(q)  qmin))2
(k+ rs2)2
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(k  g(E(q)  qmin))2
2(k+ rs2)
.
The second term on the right-hand side can be written as a form of the variance of q. Since E(q)  qmin =
hqmax+qmin
h+1   qmin = h(qmax qmin)h+1 = hDh+1 , it follows that (k  g(E(q)  qmin))2 = (ghD)2

(h+1)l 1
h+1
2
as
before. Therefore, the maximized expected profit under the optimal piece-rate incentive scheme is given by
Eppr(bpr) = Ep f w(g, h) +
(ghD)2
2(k+ rs2)

(h + 1)l  1
h + 1
2
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(2h + 1)g2((h + 1)l  1)2
2(k+ rs2)
h2D2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(2h + 1)g2((h + 1)l  1)2
2(k+ rs2)
Var(q).
Proposition 9 (maximized profit under the piece-rate contract). The maximized expected profit under the
optimal piece-rate incentive scheme is given by
Eppr(g, h,l) = Ep f w(g, h) +
(2h + 1)g2((h + 1)l  1)2
2(k+ rs2)
Var(q).
The pay-performance sensitivity bpr of the optimal piece-rate incentive scheme is supposed to be positive.
This restricts the upper bound on the marginal productivity g in the response function. By Eq.(25), the
incentive intensity bpr is strictly positive for every (h,l) 2 Aqb indeed.
This subsection analyzes the following performance measurement of the optimal piece-rate incentive
scheme. Now consider how the optimal piece-rate contract performs relative to the menu of linear con-
tracts. The relevant incremental gain relative to the optimal fixed-wage contract is defined by [Eppr  
Ep f w]/[Epm`  Ep f w]. Rewrite the relative incremental gain as a function of l and h;
21Since the second-order condition is satisfied, it follows that the first-order condition characterizes the optimal component
of the incentive sensitivity: 0 = dEppr(bpr)db =  gE(q) + k  2bprk+ gqmin + (k  rs2)bpr =  gE(q) + k+ gqmin   (k+ rs2)bpr.
Solving for bpr to get b = k+gqmin gE(q)k+rs2 =
k g(E(q) qmin)
k+rs2 .
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fpr(h,l) =
Eppr(g, h,l) Ep f w(g, h)
Epm`(g, h,l) Ep f w(g, h) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2
(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2 + h2 if
2h+1
h+1 > l > 1,
(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)2
2(h + 1)h2l
2h+1
h
if 1h+1 < l 6 1.
Notice that the function fpr(h,l) is continuous.22 In order to find the upper and lower bounds on the
relative incremental gain, I shall check the monotonicity of the function fpr(h,l) with respect to l for each
h. The derivative of the function fpr(h,l) with respect to l is the following:
¶fpr(h,l)
¶l
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
2h2(2h + 1)((h + 1)l  1)
(h + 1)((1  l)2 + 2h2l2 + h(1  l)(1  3l))2 if l > 1,
(2h + 1)l 
3h+1
h (2h + 1  (h + 1)l)((h + 1)l  1)
2(h + 1)h3
if 1h+1 < l 6 1.
Firstly, suppose that there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l > 1). Since h > 0, it follows
that (h + 1)l > 1, and so fpr(h,l) is strictly increasing in l as long as l > 1:
sgn¶fpr(h,l)
¶l
jl>1= sgn[(h + 1)l  1] = plus.
Therefore, the upper bound is attained as l ! 2h+1h+1 , while the lower bound as l ! 1.23 In other words,
fpr(h,l) varies from 2h+12(h+1) to
8h+4
8h+5 monotonically for each h when there is no bunching in the menu of
linear contracts (l > 1):
8><>:
sup
h
fpr(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
= fpr

h, 2h+1h+1

= 8h+48h+5 ,
inf
h
fpr(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
= fpr(h, 1) =
2h+1
2(h+1) .
(41)
22When l > 1, fpr(h, 1) jl>1= (2h+1)((h+1)l 1)
2
(2h+1)((h+1)l 1)2+h2 jl>1=
(2h+1)h2
(2h+1)h2+h2 =
(2h+1)h2
2(h+1)h2 =
2h+1
2(h+1) . When l 6 1, fpr(h, 1) jl>1=
(2h+1)((h+1)l 1)2
2(h+1)h2l
2h+1
h
jl61= (2h+1)(h+1 1)
2
2(h+1)h2 =
2h+1
2(h+1) .
23If I drop the restriction 2h+1h+1 > l on the parameter l, I have sup[fpr(h,l) j l > 1] = liml!¥ fpr(h,l) = 1.
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η
1
φpr(η, λ)
Lower Bound φpr(η, 1) | 2η+1
η+1 >λ>1
= 2η+1
2(η+1)
0 1
0.5
0.75
0.8
Upper Bound φpr
(
η,
2η+1
η+1
)
| 2η+1
η+1 >λ>1
= 8η+48η+5
Figure 7: fpr(h,l) when there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts
I thus have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 10 (performance of the piece-rate contract). Suppose that there is no bunching in the menu
of linear contracts (l > 1). The relative incremental gain varies from 2h+12(h+1) to
8h+4
8h+5 for each first-order
stochastic dominance shift parameter h. In particular, if the worker heterogeneity is distributed uniformly,
then the optimal piece-rate incentive scheme secures more than 75 percent of the gain under the menu of
linear contracts.
The lower bound on the relative incremental gain is equal to 75% when the heterogeneity of the workers is
distributed uniformly. However, in order to secure more substantial gain, the first-order stochastic dominance
shift parameter h must be much higher than the unity. For instance, the lower bound fpr(h, 1) is greater
than 90% for any h > 4.
Next, I shall consider the case in which a single piece-rate contract is available for the firm and there is
a bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l 6 1). There is a marked difference between the two simple
contracts when there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts. I need to verify that the function fpr(h,l)
is monotone with respect to l for each h when l 6 1. Eq.(42) below tells us that when l varies from 1h+1
to 1, the sign of the derivative of the relative incremental gain with respect to l is represented as the sign of
the product of two terms: 2h + 1  (h + 1)l and (h + 1)l  1. Regarding the first term 2h + 1  (h + 1)l,
I see that l 6 1 implies (h + 1)l 6 h + 1. Then, (h + 1)l  1  2h 6 h   2h =  h 6 0. I conclude that
2h + 1  (h + 1)l > 0 with equality only if 2h+1h+1 = l for every (h,l) 2 Aqb.24 On the other hand, the
second term (h + 1)l   1 is strictly positive for every (h,l) 2 Apr. In summary, the sign of the partial
derivative of the expression for f(h,l) with respect to h is determined in the following way.
sgn¶fpr(h,l)
¶l
j 1
h+1<l61
= sgn[(2h + 1  (h + 1)l)((h + 1)l  1)] = plus. (42)
24Notice that (h,l) = (0, 1) is ruled out by the restriction l > 1h+1 .
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According to Eq.(42), the relative incremental gain increases in l for each h. Therefore, the upper bound
is attained as l ! 1, while the lower bound as l ! 1h+1 . In other words, fpr(h,l) varies from 0 to 2h+12(h+1)
monotonically for each h when there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l 6 1):
8><>:
sup
h
fpr(h,l) j 1h+1 < l 6 1
i
= fpr(h, 1) =
2h+1
2(h+1) ,
inf
h
fpr(h,l) j 1h+1 < l 6 1
i
= fpr

h, 1h+1

= 0.
(43)
These boundaries are depicted in Figure 8. The intuition behind the poor performance of the piece-rate
contract when l = kghD converges to 1h+1 stems from the fact that there is no incentive effect because the
corresponding incentive intensity tends to zero.
η
1
φpr(η, λ)
0
Upper Bound φpr(η, 1) | 1
η+1<λ61
= 2η+1
2(η+1)
1
0.5
0.75
Lower Bound φpr(η,
1
η+1 ) | 1
η+1<λ61
= 0
Figure 8: fpr(h,l) when there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts
Table 2 summaries the upper and the lower bounds on the relative incremental gain of the piece-rate
contract for several values of h. If there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts and private information
is distributed uniformly, the piece-rate incentive scheme can secure at most 75 percent of the gain secured
by the optimal menu of linear contracts.
h
0.1 0.2 0.4 1 2 4 10 20
upper bounds 0.545455 0.583333 0.642857 0.75 0.83333 0.9 0.954545 0.97619
lower bounds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The relative incremental gain of the piece-rate contract ([Eppr   Ep f w]/[EpO   Ep f w]) when
there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts
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5.3 Comparison of two simple contracts
In this subsection, I shall compare the relative performances analyzed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Suppose
that there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l > 1). According to Eq.(37) and Eq.(41), the
remarkable fact is that both simple contracts, the quota-based contract and the piece-rate contract, attain
the same upper bound when there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts, that is, there is no difference
between the two simple contracts for the ”best-case” scenario:
sup
h
fqb(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
=
8h + 4
8h + 5
= sup
h
fpr(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1
i
.
For the ”worse-case” scenario, the lower bound on the relative performance of the quota-based contract
is superior to that of the piece-rate contract for the entire class of the distribution functions considered in
the paper:
inf[fqb(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1]
inf[fpr(h,l) j 2h+1h+1 > l > 1]
=
2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h
2h+1
2(h+1)
= 4

h + 1
2h + 1
 2h+1
h ! 4
e
 1.47152 as h ! 0.
Next, suppose that there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts (l 6 1). According to Eq.(38)
and Eq.(43), needless to say, the quota-based contract is always superior to the piece-rate contract unless h
tends to infinity, and the advantage of the quota-based contract is quite noticeable as h tends to zero:
fqb(h,l)j 1h+1<l61
sup[fpr(h,l) j 1h+1 < l 6 1]
=
2

h+1
2h+1
 h+1
h
2h+1
2(h+1)
= 4

h + 1
2h + 1
 2h+1
h
.
6 Discussions
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I shall compare the incentive sensitivities under alternative
contracts. The literature on pay for performance has argued the effects of changing the compensation method
on performance or productivity. I provide an answer to this question in Section 6.1.
It is important to understand the intuition behind the design of simple contracts. The theoretical
benchmark I consider here is the optimal menu of linear contracts, a continuum of type-dependent linear
contracts. Each contract is linear in the performance measure, but it could be non-linear in the reported
type. It is worth comparing all of compensation schemes studied in the paper in the same domain because
the optimal menu of linear contracts depends on an announcement of type or private information, although
the simple contracts depend on output. In Section 6.2, I provide a procedure to transform the optimal menu
of linear contracts as a direct revelation mechanism into an anonymous nonlinear compensation scheme as
an indirect mechanism.
6 DISCUSSIONS 32/52
6.1 Incentive effects
I have derived the incentive sensitivities under alternative three contracts in Sections 3 and 4. The marginal
types under the several optimal contracts are summarized in Table 3. Any type above the corresponding
marginal type will exert positive effort. Less productive workers will choose the fixed wage contract if it
is available. Since qm`min < q
qb
min always holds, I may conclude that the quota-based contract has a stronger
sorting effect than the menu of linear contracts.
Type of contract Marginal type Remark
Piece-rate incentive scheme or Linear contract qmin
Quota-based compensation scheme qqbmin = qmax   k(h+1)gh(2h+1) q
qb
min > qmin () 2h+1h+1 > 1
Menu of linear contracts qm`min = qmax   kgh qm`min > qmin () l > 1
Table 3: Marginal types under alternative contracts
In order to evaluate incentive effects of the contracts discussed above, it suffices to pay attention to the
performance pay-sensitivities because the forms of effort and sales response functions yield that production
is strictly increasing in q:
yj(q) = gq + ej(q) = gq + b j(q)k, where j = m`, qb, pr. (44)
Table 4 shows that all of incentive intensities measure the extent of unctrollable risk and incentives as
in the early theoretical literature on incentives. All of them share the usual property such as it is smaller
if the agent is more risk averse or there is more uncertainty or marginal disutility increases more quickly.
These formulas show that how these contracts depend on the details of the distribution of the heterogeneity
of workers.
Since both bpr and bqb are positive over the relevant set of parameters Aqb, it follows that the greater
the measurement error s2, the weaker the strength of the incentive. Similar to the incentive intensity of the
menu of linear contracts. Furthermore, it is obvious that bqb converges to bpr as qqbmin ! qmin or equivalently
as 2h+1h+1 ! l.
Type of contract Pay-performance sensitivity
Piece-rate incentive scheme or Linear contract bpr = k g(E(q) qmin)k+rs2 =
k
k+rs2
 
1  gk (E(q)  qmin)

Quota-based compensation scheme bqb = 2hk(2h+1)(k+rs2) =
k
k+rs2

1  gk (E[q j q > q
qb
min]  qqbmin)

Menu of linear contracts bm`(q) = max
n
k
k+rs2

1  gk 1 F(q)f (q)

, 0
o
Table 4: Incentive effects
6 DISCUSSIONS 33/52
Compared to the pay performance sensitivity of the complete contract bc = kk+rs2 =
1
1+crs2 with k =
1
c ,
the incentive sensitivity bm`(q) and the corresponding effort em`(q) = bm`(q)k of the menu of linear contracts
are downward-distorted except at the top.25 That is, only the top type qmax puts forth the efficient level of
effort:26
bm`(q) =
k
k+ rs2

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)

6 bc with equality only if q = qmax.
It will be shown that both simple contracts have weaker incentive effects than the menu of linear contracts.
More precisely, I shall show that the incentive sensitivities under those simple contracts are expressed in
terms of the expectation of the incentive sensitivity of the menu of linear contracts.
For any interval [qˆ, qmax], the expectation of the pay-performance sensitivity rule bm`(q) of the menu of
linear contracts is given by
Z qmax
qˆ
bm`(q) f (q)dq =
Z qmax
qˆ
k
k+ rs2

1  gh(qmax   q)
k

f (q)dq
=
k
k+ rs2
Z qmax
qˆ

1  ghqmax
k

f (q)dq +
gh
k+ rs2
Z qmax
qˆ
q f (q)dq
=
k  ghqmax
k+ rs2
(1  F(qˆ)) + gh
k+ rs2
E[q j q > qˆ](1  F(qˆ))
=
1  F(qˆ)
k+ rs2
 
k  ghqmax + gh(hqmax + qˆ)
h + 1
!
=
1  F(qˆ)
k+ rs2
 
k  gh(qmax   qˆ)
h + 1
!
=
(1  F(qˆ))k
k+ rs2

1  g
k
 
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ (45)
because by definition of the expectation of q over the interval [qˆ, qmax], I have
gh(qmax   qˆ)
h + 1
= g
 
hqmax + qˆ
h + 1
  qˆ
!
= g
 R qmax
qˆ
q f (q)dq
1  F(qˆ)   qˆ
!
= g
 
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ . (46)
25The contract under complete information can be derived as follows. The firm maximizes profit for type q: y  
w(y) = y   (a + by) = (1   b)y   a = (1   b)(gq + e + #)   a. Since the expectation of the noise # is zero,
the firm maximizes (1   b(q))(gq + e(q))   a subject to a(q) + b(q)(gq + e(q))   C(e(q))   rs2b(q)2/2 > w¯ and e(q) 2
argmax

a(q) + b(q)(gq + e)  C(e)  rs2b(q)2/2 j e > 0. The first-order condition yields that bc = kk+rs2 . In particular, when
the disutility function of the agent is given by C(e) = 12 ce2, substituting k = 1/c yields the familiar expression for the optimal
pay-performance sensitivity: bc = 11+crs2 . See Gibbons (1987, pp.2-3) for a general strictly convex disutility function.
26Gibbons (1987) obtained the same no-distortion-at-the-top result without restricting the class of mechanisms when the
agent is risk-neutral.
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Therefore, the average of the incentive effects under the menu of linear contracts over the interval [qˆ, qmax]
is given by Eq.(47):
E[bm`(q) j q > qˆ] 4=
R qmax
qˆ
bm`(q) f (q)dq
1  F(qˆ) =
k
k+ rs2

1  g
k
 
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ . (47)
In particular, when qˆ = qqbmin,
E[bm`(q) j q > qqbmin] =
k
k+ rs2

1  g
k

E[q j q > qqbmin]  qqbmin

= bqb.
Similarly, when qˆ = qmin,
E[bm`(q)] = E[bm`(q) j q > qmin] = kk+ rs2

1  g
k
(E(q)  qmin)

= bpr.
It remains to compare the two incentive sensitivities, bqb and bpr. Differentiating Eq.(47) with respect
to the lower boundary qˆ, I see that the sign of the derivative is strictly positive as long as h > 0: since
E[q j q > qˆ]  qˆ = h(qmax qˆ)h+1 , it follows that the average of the personalized incentive intensities of the menu
of linear contracts over the interval [qˆ, qmax] increases with the marginal type:
¶
¶qˆ
E[bm`(q) j q > qˆ] = ¶
¶qˆ
 
1
k+ rs2
 
k  gh(qmax   qˆ)
h + 1
!!
=
gh
(k+ rs2)(h + 1)
> 0.
Such monotonicity of E[q j q > qˆ] in qˆ, together with qqbmin > qmin, implies that bqb > bpr with equality
only if 2h+1h+1 = l or equivalently q
qb
min = qmin. I have obtained the following result.
Proposition 11 (incentive effects). Compared with the menu of linear contracts, the two simple contracts,
the quota-based contract and the piece-rate contract, are characterized as follows:
bpr = E[bm`(q)] 6 E[bm`(q) j q > qqbmin] = bqb < bc,
where the weak inequality is satisfied with equality only if 2h+1h+1 = l.
Figure 9 illustrates how the simple contracts distort incentives, relative to the menu of linear contracts
and the complete-information contract. Intuitively, under the quota-based contract, productive workers
benefit from a higher rate.
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θ
Pay-performance sensitivities
0
θmin θmax
βmℓ(θ)
βpr
βqb
E(θ)
βmℓ(θmax) = βc
No-distortion-at-the-top
E[βmℓ(θ)]
θmℓmin
E[βmℓ(θ) | θ > θ
qb
min]
Figure 9: Pay-performance sensitivities (l 6 1)
As a corollary, it turns out that the simple linear contract and the menu of linear contracts yield the
same average production:
E[ypr(q)] =
Z qmax
qmin
[gq + bprk] f (q)dq =
Z qmax
qmin
gq f (q)dq +E[bm`(q)]k
=
Z qmax
qmin
[gq + bm`(q)k] f (q)dq = E[ym`(q)],
because bm`(q) = 0 for every q 6 qm`min. On the other hand, a switch to the quota-based contract reduces
the average production:
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E[yqb(q)] =
Z qqbmin
qmin
gq f (q)dq +
Z qmax
q
qb
min
[gq + bqbk] f (q)dq
= gE(q) + bqbk(1  F(qqbmin))
= gE(q) +E[bm`(q) j q > qqbmin]k(1  F(qqbmin))
= gE(q) +
0B@
R qmax
q
qb
min
bm`(q) f (q)dq
1  F(qqbmin)
1CA k(1  F(qqbmin))
= gE(q) +
Z qmax
q
qb
min
bm`(q)k f (q)dq
< gE(q) +
Z qmax
qm`min
bm`(q)k f (q)dq
=
Z qmax
qmin
[gq + bm`(q)k] f (q)dq
= E[ym`(q)],
where the last strict inequality follows from the fact that qqbmin < q
qb
min and bm`(q) > 0 over the interval
(qm`min, q
qb
min). Therefore, the average production under the quota-based contract is less than that of the
linear contract and the menu of linear contracts. Following the results in the previous section, there is no
clear relationship between productivity and profitability. Under the quota-based contract, workers are less
motivated on average, however, it seem to be more profitable than the piece-rate contract.
6.2 The near optimality of quota-based compensation scheme
In this subsection, I discuss the implementability of menu of linear contracts via a single scheme. I have
discussed the menu of linear contracts as a benchmark because most incentive schemes observed in practice
are linear. The main purpose of this subsection is to show that such menu of linear contracts can be
implemented via a single and interpretable compensation scheme. The result here provides an intuition
for why a single quota-based contract performs well better than a single piece-rate contract. I would like
to consider why a simple piece-wise linear contract sufficiently performs well instead of the menu of linear
contracts. Denote the range of output under the menu of linear contracts by Y = [ym`(qmin), ym`(qmax)]. It
will be shown that the worker’s optimization problem can be reformulated as a simple optimization problem
in terms of the wage schedule t : Y ! R in the sense that the production rule and the information rent under
the menu of linear contracts are achieved under the unanimous wage schedule t : Y ! R defined below.
Recall that the worker of type q faces the following certainty equivalent under the truth-telling:27
27Laffont and Martimort (2002, p.376) note that ”To reconstruct the indirect mechanism TSB(q) from the direct mechanism
ftSB(q), qSB(q)g is rather easy. Indeed, we must have TSB(q) = tSB(qSB(q)).” However, in my setting, it seems to be annoying to
analyze the second derivative of such indirect mechanism.
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CEm`(q) = am`(q) + bm`(q)(gq + em`(q))  rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2   C(em`(q))
=

am`(q)  rs
2
2
bm`(q)
2 + bm`(q)ym`(q)

  C(ym`(q)  gq). (48)
The expression inside the brackets in Eq.(48) can be considered as the payment under the linear contract
adjusted with risk premium. When the following two requirements in Eq.(49) are satisfied for a menu of
linear contracts, I can say that the wage schedule t : Y ! R implements the menu of linear contracts. Here,
for each type q, the required effort e = y  gq should be non-negative.
8<:Requirement 1: ym`(q) 2 argmax[t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq],Requirement 2: CEm`(q) = max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq]. (49)
A version of the taxation principle in this context is the following.28 Proposition 12 holds not only for
the optimal menu of linear contracts derived in Proposition 1.
Proposition 12 (Taxation Principle). For every feasible menu of linear contracts ham`(), bm`()i, the cor-
responding certainty equivalent CEm`() with the boundary condition CEm`(qmin) = w¯ is achieved by the
wage schedule t : Y ! R defined by Eq.(50):
t(y) = min
"Z qˆ
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(y  gqˆ) j qˆ 2 [qmin, qmax]
#
+ w¯ (50)
for each y 2 Y .
Proof of Proposition 12. It will be shown that ym`(q) 2 argmax[t(y)   C(y   gq) j y > gq] for every
q 2 [qmin, qmax]. Consider any q 2 [qmin, qmax]. It suffices to show that max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq] =
t(ym`(q))  C(ym`(q)  gq). Let h(y, qˆ) =
R qˆ
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(y  gqˆ). Notice that t(y) = min [h(y, qˆ) j
qˆ 2 [qmin, qmax]] + w¯. The first-and second-order conditions with respect to qˆ are the following:
hqˆ(y, qˆ) = bm`(qˆ)g+ C
0(y  gqˆ)( g) = bm`(qˆ)g+ gk (y  gqˆ) =
g
k
 
bm`(qˆ)k  y+ gqˆ

and
hqˆqˆ(y, qˆ) =
g
k
 
b˙m`(qˆ)k+ g

= gb˙m`(qˆ) +
g2
k
.
By the weak monotonicity of bm`() and g > 0, the second-order condition is always satisfied, that is,
hqˆqˆ(y, qˆ) > 0 holds. Thus, the first-order condition is sufficient. In particular, the pair (y(q), q) satisfies the
first-order condition hqˆ(y, qˆ) = 0 because bm`(q)k  y(q) + gq = (em`(q) + gq)  y(q) = y(q)  y(q) = 0.
It turns out that h(y(q), qˆ) is minimized at qˆ = q. Therefore, I have
28A similar method was used in Watabe (2016) in a context of second-degree price discrimination.
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t(ym`(q)) =
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(ym`(q)  gq) + w¯.
This yields that
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds = t(ym`(q))  C(ym`(q)  gq)  w¯.
Recall the envelope condition C˙Em`(q) = bm`(q)g in terms of the certainty equivalent rather than the
information rent as a part of the incentive compatibility constraint. The certainty equivalent under the menu
of linear contracts is written as
CEm`(q) CEm`(qmin) =
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds.
This, together with the expression for the information rent, yields that the indirect utility under the wage
schedule t() achieves the same certainty equivalent under the menu of linear contracts:
CEm`(q) = w¯+
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds
= w¯+ [t(ym`(q))  C(ym`(q)  gq)  w¯]
= t(ym`(q))  C(ym`(q)  gq). (51)
Next, I will show that max [t(y)   C(y   gq) j y > gq] = CEm`(q). Consider any y > 0. By defi-
nition of t(), I see that t(y) 6 R qqmin bm`(s)gds+ C(y  gq) + w¯, which implies that t(y)  C(y  gq) 6R q
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ w¯ = CEm`(q). Since y was arbitrary chosen, it follows that max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y >
gq] 6 CEm`(q). On the other hand, I see that max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq]  CEm`(q) > t(ym`(q)) 
C(ym`(q) gq) CEm`(q) = 0, where the last equality follows from Eq.(51). Hence, max [t(y) C(y gq) j
y > gq] > CEm`(q). These two inequalities imply the following equivalence:
max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq] = CEm`(q). (52)
Equations (51) and (52) yield that
max [t(y)  C(y  gq) j y > gq] = t(ym`(q))  C(ym`(q)  gq).
I conclude that y(q) solves the worker’s optimization problem under the wage schedule t : Y ! R. This
establishes the proposition. 
The advantage of constructing the particular wage schedule is that its second-derivative is tractable for
the analysis of the shape of it. Firstly, the wage schedule t() defined in Eq.(50) satisfies the following
envelope condition. I call such selection y(y) as a type-assignment function.29
29Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) formulate averse selection principal-agent problems by restricting attention to envelope
condition of nonlinear tariffs in the context of the second-degree price discrimination where the agent’s utility function satisfies
the usual single-crossing property. They do not attempt to analyze the shape of nonlinear tariffs.
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t0(y) = C0(y  gy(y)), (53)
where y(y) 2 argmin
"Z qˆ
qmin
b(s)gds+ C(y  gqˆ) j qˆ 2 [qmin, qmax]
#
.
It will be shown that it is strictly convex beyond max fym`(qmin), ym`(qqbmin)g, but it is constant over the
interval [ym`(qmin), ym`(qqbmin)] if there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts. I need to identify the
sign of the second derivative of the wage schedule. Differentiating the envelope condition in Eq.(53) with
respect to y to get,
t00(y) = C00(y  gy(y)) (1  gy0(y)). (54)
If the wage schedule has a piece-wise linear part, then the second derivative of the optimal wage schedule
must be zero. The sign of the second derivative of the wage schedule is determined by the sign of the
second term on the right-hand side in Eq.(54) because the disutility function of effort is assumed to be
strictly convex. Here, it must be emphasized that the type-assignment function y(y) has an easy economic
interpretation. Actually, its derivative and the derivative of the production rule are related inversely.
Lemma 3. For every feasible menu of linear contracts ham`(), bm`()i and the corresponding certainty
equivalent CEm`() with the boundary condition CEm`(qmin) = w¯, the type-assignment correspondence
G(y) = argmin
"Z qˆ
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(y  gqˆ) j qˆ 2 [qmin, qmax]
#
has the following properties:
(1) G(y) is a compact subset of [qmin, qmax] for each y 2 Y.
(2) The composite G  y : [qmin, qmax] ! [qmin, qmax] is self-belonging in the sense that q 2 G(ym`(q)) for
every q 2 [qmin, qmax].
Proof of Lemma 3. The first assertion is immediate from the Berge’s maximum theorem. Suppose, by way
of contradiction, that q 62 G(ym`(q)). By definition, y(ym`(q)) 2 G(ym`(q)). Since q 2 [qmin, qmax], it must
be the case that
Z y(ym`(q))
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(ym`(q)  gy(ym`(q))) <
Z q
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(ym`(q)  gq)). (55)
There are two possible cases to be considered. If q > y(ym`(q)), then the inequality in Eq.(55) gives us
0 <
Z q
y(ym`(q))
bm`(s)gds+ C(ym`(q)  gq)  C(ym`(q)  gy(ym`(q)))
=
Z q
y(ym`(q))
C˙Em`(s)ds+ C(ym`(q)  gq)  C(ym`(q)  gy(ym`(q)))
= CEm`(q) CEm`(y(ym`(q))) + C(ym`(q)  gq)  C(ym`(q)  gy(ym`(q)))
= CEm`(q) + C(ym`(q)  gq)g   fCEm`(y(ym`(q))) + C(ym`(q)  gy(ym`(q)))g
= t(ym`(q))  t(ym`(q)) = 0.
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This is a contradiction. The proof of the remaining case is similar. This establishes the lemma. 
The following lemma states that the procedure of constructing the single nonlinear compensation scheme
involves the inverse of the production rule.30
Lemma 4. For every feasible menu of linear contracts ham`(), bm`()i and the corresponding certainty equiv-
alent CEm`() with the boundary condition CEm`(qmin) = w¯, the type-assignment function is written as the
inverse function of the production rule: for each y˜ 2 Y ,
argmin
"Z qˆ
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(y˜  gqˆ) j qˆ 2 [qmin, qmax]
#
= fy 1m` (y˜)g.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let y˜ 2 Y . Firstly, I will show that for each type-assignment function y(y˜) 2 G(y˜), both
composites (1) ym`  y : Y ! Y and (2) y  ym` : [qmin, qmax] ! [qmin, qmax] are identity functions. For the
first identity, any interior optimum y(y˜) yields the following first-order condition:
0 = bm`(y(y˜))g+ C0(y˜  gy(y˜))( g)
= bm`(y(y˜))g  gk (y˜  gy(y˜))
=
g
k
(bm`(y(y˜))k  y˜+ gy(y˜))
=
g
k
(em`(y(y˜)) + gy(y˜)  y˜)
=
g
k
(ym`(y(y˜))  y˜) ,
and hence y˜ = ym`(y(y˜)) = (ym` y)(y˜). This establishes that the composite ym` y : Y ! Y is the identity
function.
It remains to show another identity. Without loss of generality, I may choose y(y˜) = min G(y˜) by
the compactness of G(y˜) in Lemma 3. Since q 2 G(ym`(q)), it follows that y(ym`(q)) 6 q. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that q > y(ym`(q)). By the strict monotonicity of the production rule, ym`(q) >
ym`(y(ym`(q))) = (ym`  y)(ym`(q)) = ym`(q), a contradiction.31 Therefore, it must be the case that
q = y(ym`(q)) = (y  ym`)(q), and hence the composite y  ym` : [qmin, qmax] ! [qmin, qmax] is the identity
function. This establishes the lemma. 
The following proposition tells us that the menu of linear contracts itself is not a linear piece-rate
compensation scheme.
30The type-assignment approach examined by Goldman et al (1984) and subsequent analysis by Nöldeke and Samuelson
(2007) solves screening problems in which direct revelation mechanism consists of a transfer rule and a decision rule by focusing
on using the inverse of a decision rule referred to as the type assignment. They obtain the solution to the principal-agent
problem from a point-wise maximization in terms of type function. Lemma 4 reveals that the method taken in the paper is
closely related with the type-assignment approach.
31Since two parameters g and k are strictly positive, and bm`() is non-decreasing, it follows that the production rule ym`(q) =
gq + em`(q) = gq + bm`(q) is strictly increasing in q.
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Proposition 13. For every feasible menu of linear contracts ham`(), bm`()i and the corresponding certainty
equivalent CEm`() with the boundary condition CE(qmin) = w¯, the wage schedule t : Y ! R defined in
Eq.(50) is a quota-based curvilinear compensation schedule, and its second derivative is given by
t00(y˜) = e˙m`(y(y˜))
k[g+ e˙m`(y(y˜))]
> 0 with equality only if e˙m`(y(y˜)) = 0,
where y(y˜) = y 1m` (y˜) for each y˜ 2 Y .
Proof of Proposition 13. By the previous lemmas, the type-assignment function is the inverse of the produc-
tion rule. This implies that
y0(y˜) = 1
y˙m`(q)
for ym`(q) = y˜.
Since the sales response function is of the form ym`(q) = gq + em`(q), it follows that
y0(y˜) = 1
g+ e˙m`(q)
,
and then
1  gy0(y˜) = 1  g
g+ e˙m`(q)
=
e˙m`(q)
g+ e˙m`(q)
.
Since C00(e) = 1k , the second derivative of the optimal wage schedule in Eq.(54) will be the following.
t00(y) = C00(y  gy(y)) (1  gy0(y))
= C00(y  gy(y)) e˙m`(y(y))
g+ e˙m`(y(y))
=
e˙m`(y(y))
k[g+ e˙m`(y(y))]
> 0 with equatliy only if e˙m`(y(y)) = 0. (56)
This establishes the proposition. 
Recall now that the effort function is constant only over [qmin, q˜] if there is a bunching in the menu of
linear contracts by Proposition 1. Therefore, the optimal wage schedule is constant over that interval. The
main finding here is that if the reservation wage is set exogenously, then the optimal menu of linear contracts
can be regarded as a single quota-based contract.
I shall use Propositions 12 and 13 to derive the single quota-based contract explicitly that implements
the menu of linear contracts in Proposition 1. Recall that the personalized pay-performance sensitivity is
given by bm`(q) = 0 for all type q 2 [qmin, qqbmin]. Then, the wage schedule can be written as
t(y) =
Z y(y)
qmin
bm`(s)gds+ C(y  gy(y)) + w¯
=
Z y(y)
qmin
g
k+ rs2
(k  gh(qmax   s))ds+ (y  gy(y))
2
2k
+ w¯.
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I can interpret this wage schedule as a combination plan with a fixed salary w¯ and the remaining part
represents commissions depending on output. It is worth to know whether the part of commissions is
linearly, progressively, or degressively.32 Recall that the type-assignment function y() is the inverse of the
sales response function ym`(). Since the sales response function is written as
ym`(q) = gq + em`(q) =
8>><>>:
gq for q 6 qqbmin,
gq +
k2
k+ rs2

1  g
k
1  F(q)
f (q)

for q > qqbmin.
Here, for each q > qqbmin, substituting (1  F(q))/ f (q) = h(qmax   q) yields that
ym`(q) = gq +
k2
k+ rs2
k  gh(qmax   q)
k
= gq

1+
kh
k+ rs2

+
k(k  ghqmax)
k+ rs2
,
and then I obtain the following type-assignment function:
y(y) =
8>><>>:
y
g
for y 6 gqqbmin,
(k+ rs2)y  k(k  ghqmax)
g((h + 1)k+ rs2)
for y > gqqbmin.
Therefore, the optimal curvilinear contract with a quota ym`(qqbmin) = gq
qb
min = g

qmax   kgh

is as
follows:
t(y) =
8>><>>:
w¯ for y 2 [ym`(qmin), ym`(qqbmin)],
(k+ (y  gqmax)h)2
2h((h + 1)k+ rs2)
+ w¯ for y 2 (ym`(qm`min), ym`(qmax)].
(57)
Moreover, the first-and the second-derivatives can be explicitly described as follows:33
t0(y) =
8>><>>:
0 for y 2 [ym`(qmin), ym`(qm`min)],
k+ h(y  gqmax)
(h + 1)k+ rs2
> 0 for y 2 (ym`(qm`min), ym`(qmax)],
(58)
t00(y) =
8><>:
0 for y 2 [ym`(qmin), ym`(qm`min)],
h
(h + 1)k+ rs2
> 0 for y 2 (ym`(qm`min), ym`(qmax)]
(59)
32Regarding the piece-wise linearity of the optimal contract, Gibbons (1987) has already argued that the worker’s private
information makes a linear contract suboptimal for risk-neutral and heterogeneous workers.
33Notice that, in the expression of the first-derivative of the wage schedule, k+ h(y  gqmax) > k+ h(ym`(qm`min)  gqmax) =
k+ h(gqm`min   gqmax) = k+ gh(qmax   qm`min) = k  gh  kgh = k  k = 0 for each y > ym`(qm`min). Therefore, the wage schedule
is strictly increasing beyond the quota ym`(qm`min).
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Eq.(57)-Eq.(59) illustrate how the quota-based contract which is equivalent to the menu of linear contracts
is affected by the information structure, the characteristics of the response function, etc. In the following
examples, I shall illustrate how a properly designed quota-based contract looks like. The existence of
a quota ym`(qm`min) depends on whether there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts. The wage
schedule is strictly increasing and strictly convex beyond the quota, and it is constant at the reservation
wage up to the quota. In the following numerical experiments, I set the values of the parameters such as
k = 1, r = 2, s2 = 1, qmax = 5 and qmin = 1.
Example 1 (no bunching case). Consider the case that there is no bunching in the menu of linear contracts
(l > 1). The three alternative forms of contracts are well-defined only if 1 < l < 2h+1h+1 as shown in Figure
10. Since l = kghD = 14gh , it follows that 1 < 14gh <
2h+1
h+1 . For each h = 0.5, 1 and 2, the value of g will
be restricted. If h = 0.5 then 1 < 12g < 21.5 yields that 38 < g < 12 . If h = 1 then 1 < 14g < 32 yields that
1
6 < g <
1
4 . Finally, if h = 2 then 1 < 18g < 53 yields that 340 < g < 18 . Therefore, I may consider the
following pairs: (g, h) = (0.4, 0.5), (0.2, 1), (0.1, 2). For these combinations of (g, h), the value of l is equal
to 1.25 (see Figure 10).
η
λ
2η+1
η+1 > λ
1
1
1.5
0
λ > 1η+1
λ > 1
1.25
0.5 2
No-bunching region
Figure 10: (g, h) = (0.4, 0.5), (0.2, 1), (0.1, 2)
The optimal compensation scheme t() are depicted in Figures 11-13. There is no kink in the compensation
schedule.
Example 2 (bunching case). Consider the case that there is a bunching in the menu of linear contracts
(l 6 1). I need to identify the relevant pairs of (g, h) again. The three alternative forms of contracts are
well-defined only if 1h+1 < l 6 1 as shown in Figure 14. Since l = kghD = 14gh , it follows that 1h+1 < 14gh 6 1.
For each h = 0.6, 1 and 2, this condition will restrict the range of the value of g. If h = 0.6 then 11.6 < 12.4g 6 1
yields that 512 6 g < 23 . If h = 1 then 12 < 14g 6 1 yields that 0.25 6 g < 0.5. Finally, if h = 2 then
2
3 <
1
8g 6 1 yields that 0.125 6 g < 316 = 0.1875. For instance, I may attention to the following pairs:
(g, h) = (0.5, 0.6), (0.3, 1), (0.15, 2). For these combinations of (g, h), the value of l is 56 (see Figure 14).
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Figure 11: (g, h) = (0.4, 0.5)
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2
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+ w¯
t(y)
Figure 12: (g, h) = (0.2, 1)
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0
5
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+ w¯
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1
6
1
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y2 + w¯
1
180
+ w¯
t(y)
Figure 13: (g, h) = (0.1, 2)
η
λ
2η+1
η+1 > λ
1
1
1.5
0
λ > 1η+1
λ 6 1
2
5
6
0.6
Bunching region
Figure 14: (g, h) = (0.5, 0.6), (0.3, 1), (0.15, 2)
The optimal compensation scheme t() are depicted in Figures 15-17. These figures suggest that the
menu of linear contracts can be substantially replicated by a single piece-wise linear contract.
Eventually, the compensation plan consists of a salary plus continuously sliding commission rates. As
mentioned in Raju and Srinivasan (1996), intuitively, any linear contract (or piece-rate contract) is not able
to incorporate the convex shape of the single quota-based plan as a representation of the menu of linear
contracts, and thus it produces a significant amount of non-optimality. In contrast, a single piece-wise quota-
based contract is able to capture the convexity of the curvilinear quota-based contract, and this results in
the high performance of it.
REFERENCES 45/52
y
0
t(y)
1
3
+ w¯
13
30
17
6
w¯
5
6
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Figure 15: (g, h) = (0.5, 0.6)
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Figure 16: (g, h) = (0.3, 1)
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0.05(1 + 2(y− 0.75))2 + w¯
Figure 17: (g, h) = (0.15, 2)
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the performance of simple piece-wise linear contracts relative to the menu
of linear contracts in a principal-agent problem under moral hazard and adverse selection. I have provided
analytical upper and lower bounds on the performance measures. It turns out that non-uniform salesforce
heterogeneity plays a crucial role in determining the performance of the piece-rate incentive scheme, while
the quota-based contract is robust to the shifts in the distribution of private information. A primary
finding is that a properly designed simple piece-wise linear contract always captures at least 73 percent of
the incremental gain secured under the optimal menu of linear contracts on the entire region of the relevant
parameter values. The paper have provided an explanation for the use of piece-wise-linear-threshold contracts
in practice.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
I need to calculate the expectation of (k  gh(qmax   q))2 over the interval [qm`min, qmax] in Eq.(13). Firstly,
notice that this term will not vanish except for q = qm`min.
k  gh(qmax   q)
8<:= k  gh(qmax   q
m`
min) = k  gh  kgh = k  k = 0 for q = qm`min,
< k  gh(qmax   qm`min) = 0 for q < qm`min.
Then, I have
Z qm`min
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq
=
Z qm`min
qmin
h
(k  ghqmax)2 + 2gh(k  ghqmax)q + g2h2q2
i
f (q)dq. (60)
The first term (k  ghqmax)2 in Eq.(60) is independent of the private informaion:
Z qm`min
qmin
(k  ghqmax)2 f (q)dq = (k  ghqmax)2F(qm`min) = (k  ghqmax)2(1  Prob(q > qm`min)). (61)
Regarding the expectation of 2gh(k  ghqmax) over the relevant interval will be
Z qm`min
qmin
2gh(k  ghqmax)q f (q)dq = 2gh(k  ghqmax)
Z qm`min
qmin
q f (q)dq
= 2gh(k  ghqmax)

E(q)  Prob(q > qm`min)

E(q) +
D  d
h + 1

. (62)
Finally, the expectation of g2h2q2 over that interval involves the expressions for the variance and the
expectation of q.
Z qm`min
qmin
g2h2q2 f (q)dq = g2h2

Var(q) +E(q)2   Prob(q > qm`min)

q2max  
2qmaxd
h + 1
+
d2
2h + 1

. (63)
Combining Eq.(61)-(63) to get
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Z qm`min
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq
= (k  ghqmax)2

1  Prob(q > qm`min)

+2gh(k  ghqmax)

E(q)  Prob(q > qm`min)

E(q) +
D  d
h + 1

+g2h2

Var(q) +E(q)2   Prob(q > qm`min)

q2max  
2qmaxd
h + 1
+
d2
2h + 1

= (k  ghqmax)2   (k  ghqmax)2Prob(q > qm`min)
+2gh(k  ghqmax)E(q)  2gh(k  ghqmax)Prob(q > qm`min)

E(q) +
D  d
h + 1

+g2h2Var(q) + g2h2E(q)2
 g2h2Prob(q > qm`min)

q2max  
2qmaxd
h + 1
+
d2
2h + 1

. (64)
Notice that
(k  ghqmax)2 + 2gh(k  ghqmax)E(q) + g2h2E(q)2 = (k  ghqmax + ghE(q))2
= (k  gh(qmax  E(q)))2
= (k  g(E(q)  qmin))2
and
E(q) +
D  d
h + 1
=
hqmax + qmin + qmax   qmin   d
h + 1
=
(h + 1)qmax   d
h + 1
= qmax   d
h + 1
.
The coefficients of Prob(q > qm`min) in Eq.(64) can be simplified as follows:
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(k  ghqmax)2 + 2gh(k  ghqmax)

E(q) +
D  d
h + 1

+ g2h2

q2max  
2qmaxd
h + 1
+
d2
2h + 1

= (k  ghqmax)2 + 2gh(k  ghqmax)

qmax   d
h + 1

+ g2h2

q2max  
2qmaxd
h + 1
+
d2
2h + 1

=

(k  ghqmax) + gh

qmax   d
h + 1
2
  g2h2 d
2
(h + 1)2
+ g2h2
d2
2h + 1
=

k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2d2

1
2h + 1
  1
(h + 1)2

=

(h + 1)k  ghd
h + 1
2
+ g2h2d2

(h + 1)2   (2h + 1)
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)

=

(h + 1)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+
g2h4d2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)
=

(h + 1)k  ghd
h + 1
2
+
g2h2h2D2
(h + 1)2(2h + 1)
d2
D2
=

(h + 1)k  ghd
h + 1
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q).
Finally, Eq.(60) can be written as
Z qm`min
qmin
(k  gh(qmax   q))2 f (q)dq
= (k  g(E(q)  qmin))2 + g2h2Var(q)  Prob(q > qm`min)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
.
 Prob(q > qm`min)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
.
Therefore, the maximized expected profit under the menu of linear contracts will be
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Epm`(g, h,l)jl61 = Eppr(g, h,l) +
g2h2Var(q)
2(k+ rs2)
  1
2(k+ rs2)
h
(k  gh(qmax  E(q)))2 + g2h2Var(q)
 Prob(q > qm`min)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
##
= Eppr(g, h,l)  (k  gh(qmax  E(q)))
2
2(k+ rs2)
+
Prob(q > qm`min)
2(k+ rs2)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
= Ep f w(g, h) +
(k  g(E(q)  qmin))2
2(k+ rs2)
  (k  gh(qmax  E(q)))
2
2(k+ rs2)
+
Prob(q > qm`min)
2(k+ rs2)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
= Ep f w(g, h)
+
Prob(q > qm`min)
2(k+ rs2)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
.
Reorganizing the experssion for Epm`(g, h,l)jl61 yields that
Epm`(g, h,l)jl61 = Ep f w(g, h) +
Prob(q > qm`min)
2(k+ rs2)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
. (65)
The second term on the right-hand side in Eq.(65) is written as
Prob(q > qm`min)
2(k+ rs2)
"
(1+ h)k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
=
1
2(k+ rs2)

d
D
 1
h
"
k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q)
#
.
Notice that
k  ghd
1+ h
= gh

k
gh
  d
1+ h

= gh

d  d
1+ h

= ghd

1+ h   1
1+ h

=
gh2d
1+ h
.
Factoring the inside the square brackets to get
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
k  ghd
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2
Var(q) =

gh2d
1+ h
2
+ g2h2

d
D
2 D2h2
(1+ h)2(1+ 2h)
=
g2h4d2
(1+ h)2

1+
1
1+ 2h

=
2g2h4d2
(1+ h)(1+ 2h)
.
Therefore, Eq.(65) becomes:
Epm`(g, h,l,l)jl61 = Ep f w(g, h) +
1
2(k+ rs2)

d
D
 1
h 2g2h4d2
(1+ h)(1+ 2h)
= Ep f w(g, h) +
1
k+ rs2

d
D
 1
h

(1+ h)g2h2d2
D2

D2h2
(1+ h)2(1+ 2h)

= Ep f w(g, h) +
(1+ h)g2h2
k+ rs2

d
D
 1+2h
h
Var(q).
This establishes the proof of Proposition 4. 
